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Belgium’s participation in European monetary union brings 
it the microeconomic beneﬁ  ts of a large commercial and 
ﬁ  nancial area without any currency risk, and the macro-
economic advantages secured by an independent central 
bank which has been given a clear mandate to maintain 
price stability. Any cost incurred in renouncing an autono-
mous monetary policy – which had been to some extent 
anticipated by the adoption of a target exchange rate 
geared to the German mark in 1990 – depends not only 
on the probability that the Belgian economy may face 
speciﬁ  c shocks, but also on the extent to which the reac-
tion to the impulses of the single monetary policy is liable 
to be atypical.
In order to supply some tentative answers to this last 
question, the present article ﬁ   rst outlines the process 
whereby monetary policy impulses are transmitted, here 
and there pinpointing special features of the Belgian 
economy. After that it presents the results of some macro-
economic simulations.
1.   Complexity of the transmission of 
monetary policy impulses
1.1   From the instrument to the objective : a long 
road
The effects of monetary policy on activity and prices 
cannot be analysed without reference to different time 
horizons. Thus, it is by maintaining price stability in the 
medium and long term that the monetary authorities will 
create the most favourable environment for sustainable 
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growth. In that respect, the mandate conferred on the 
Eurosystem and the disappearance of the currency risk 
within the euro area give Belgian economic agents the 
assurance of monetary stability in a huge economic area.
In the shorter term, the monetary authorities contribute 
to the stabilisation of growth, since they take account of 
the fact that cyclical ﬂ  uctuations will generate upward 
or downward pressure on prices. The desire to stabilise 
activity also explains why the price stability objective 
is deﬁ  ned in the medium term, permitting a gradual 
response to certain shocks affecting prices. However, it 
cannot give way to a desire to stimulate activity to the 
detriment of price stability, which would rekindle inﬂ  a-
tionary expectations.
The central bank tries to attain its objectives by respond-
ing to the various shocks affecting the economy. Thus, 
demand may be boosted by “ﬁ  nancial  exuberance”, 
strong wage increases, a lax ﬁ  scal policy, or strong foreign 
expansion, etc. If such shocks give rise to inﬂ  ationary pres-
sure, the central bank may feel obliged to put the brakes 
on economic expansion in order to preserve an environ-
ment conducive to longer-term growth. Conversely, 
supply may be augmented by increased productivity 
gains. In that case, it may be necessary to ease monetary 
policy in order to encourage the adjustment of demand. 
A rise in oil prices is a more awkward shock, depressing 
activity and pushing up prices. The central bank will have 
to make sure that such a shock does not trigger any 
inﬂ  ationary drift.
(1)  The authors would like to thank K. Burggraeve and Ph. Jeanﬁ  ls for the 
macroeconomic simulations which they carried out, and for their comments.38
Since the Belgian economy is closely interwoven with that 
of Europe, the movements are similar to those occurring in 
the euro area. In recent decades, it has been little affected 
by “asymmetric shocks” and has produced hardly any 
asymmetric response to common shocks. Together with 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, Belgium is 
one of the countries where developments in activity and 
prices were closest to the average for the euro area during 
the period 1993-2000.  (1)
Monetary policy impulses are speciﬁ  c shocks (or counter-
shocks) which have only an indirect effect on activity and 
prices. The central bank only exerts direct control over 
very short-term interest rates on the money market. 
These inﬂ  uence  other  ﬁ   nancial variables which in turn 
affect behaviours on the goods and services markets and 
on the labour market, where costs and prices are deter-
mined (chart  1). Throughout this transmission process, 
the expectations of economic agents – ﬁ  nancial market 
  participants and parties involved in setting wages and 
prices, in particular – play an essential role.
1.2   The inﬂ  uence exerted on the ﬁ  nancial variables
The anticipations of economic agents come into play right 
in the initial stages of the transmission of monetary policy 
impulses, as the same increase in the very short-term 
interest rate has very different effects on the yield curve 
depending on how it is perceived. If it was anticipated, it 
has hardly any impact on longer-term rates. If unexpected 
and regarded as long-lasting, e.g. because it augurs better 
growth prospects, it may push the whole curve upwards. 
Conversely, if it reinforces the anti-inﬂ  ationary credibility 
of the central bank it may cause long-term rates to fall.
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CHART 1  MAIN CHANNELS FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY IMPULSES (1)
(1)  This diagram simplifies all the interactions between the different variables presented, in order to show only the main channels through which a monetary policy impulse travels 
before affecting the goods and services markets.39
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Moreover, long-term interest rates in the euro area do not 
depend solely on the monetary policy of the Eurosystem 
and its future expected stance, but may also be inﬂ  uenced 
by other factors. Thus, they are directly affected by long-
term rates in the United States, a phenomenon which 
became abundantly clear at the time of the abrupt rise in 
global bond market rates in 1994.
Where exchange rates are concerned, the multiplicity of 
factors taken into account in forming anticipations is such 
that the normal reaction to a short-term interest rate hike 
– namely (assuming that foreign interest rates remain 
steady) the appreciation of the currency in which invest-
ments have become more lucrative – does not always 
occur. That is why it is important, in any empirical exercise 
assessing the effects of monetary policy, to be able to 
identify the exchange rate channel.
Money and bond market interest rates in turn determine 
the rates applied by banks on loans and deposits. A forth-
coming article will be devoted to the setting of bank rates 
in Belgium. Changes in the monetary policy stance may 
also affect the other bank lending criteria. Thus, a rise in 
interest rates which, all other things being equal, could 
cause a deterioration in the ﬁ  nancial position of borrow-
ers, may induce banks to ration credit in so far as they 
fear that higher rates may lead them to be presented with 
projects which are too risky (adverse selection).
Once monetary policy has been tightened, the slackening 
pace of lending and the increased attraction of invest-
ments in securities curb the expansion of the money 
stock.
Finally, a rise in interest rates normally causes a fall in the 
price of assets, constituting the discounted value of future 
income, such as the prices of existing equities and bonds, 
and property prices.
1.3   Channels through which ﬁ  nancial variables 
inﬂ  uence real variables
If the central bank raises interest rates,  (1) that is likely to 
affect the variables in the ‘real’ economy through various 
channels. The most traditional one is that of inter-  temporal 
choices  : economic agents are encouraged to substitute 
ﬁ   nancial assets – which have become more remunera-
tive  – for real assets, or to contract fewer debts, and thus 
to defer their consumption and investment expenditure. 
In general, we refer to the substitution channel in the case 
of consumers and the capital cost channel in the case of 
businesses. These effects have their greatest impact on 
expenditure on consumer durables, property, equipment 
and stocks, because those types of expenditure can more 
easily be postponed.
Furthermore, higher interest rates mean higher interest 
charges for borrowers and more income for lenders. 
These income effects are felt sooner if existing loans are 
short-term. In this connection, it appears that in Belgium, 
as in the majority of euro area countries, medium- and 
long-term borrowing predominates, especially where 
mortgage loans are concerned.  (2)  Demand for goods 
and services will be affected in so far as the propensity 
to spend current income varies between borrowers and 
lenders. Overall, the income effect will be positive for 
households in general and negative for businesses, where 
cash ﬂ   ow becomes tighter (see below), and for public 
authorities.
On the other hand, the fall in asset values caused by an 
increase in interest rates exerts a negative wealth effect 
on household consumption, provided it is seen as rela-
tively permanent. The scale of the wealth effects depends 
on many factors. In Belgium, as in most euro area coun-
tries, it appears to be relatively limited, especially in com-
parison with the United States.  (3) However, it may have 
increased, given the spread of shareholding, especially via 
under  takings for collective investment.
(1)  The effects of a decrease in interest rates may be considered symmetrical.
(2)  In regard to the housing market, see V. Baugnet, D. Cornille and M. Druant 
(2003).



























CHART 2  NET FINANCIAL ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE 
EURO AREA COUNTRIES (1)
  (End of 2000, percentages of GDP)
Source : Report on Financial Structures, ECB, 2002.
(1)  Data for Ireland and Luxembourg are not available.40
It is true that Belgium is notable for the level of house-
holds’ net ﬁ  nancial wealth, which is partly the corollary 
to the level of the public debt (chart 2). However, those 
assets include a large proportion of unlisted shares, which 
are perhaps recorded more comprehensively than in other 
countries, and the difference in relation to the euro area 
average as regards the scale of the public debt is tending 
to diminish.
The fall in share prices caused by a tightening of mon-
etary policy is also liable to curb investment, since it is a 
disincentive to issue shares. The ratio between the stock 
market capitalisation and the replacement value of the 
capital stock, known as Tobin’s Q, inﬂ  uences the choice 
between the acquisition of existing companies and invest-
ment. Once again, this effect is probably less pronounced 
in the euro area than in the United States.
The negative effects of an interest rate increase on 
domestic demand may be reinforced by the existence of 
a credit channel, owing to the imperfection of the ﬁ  nan-
cial markets with their information asymmetry. A tighter 
monetary policy may in fact lead not only to a rise in the 
general level of interest rates but also to an increase in 
the external ﬁ  nancing premium, or even credit rationing, 
since it is likely to aggravate the information asymmetry 
problem. On the one hand, the least liquid and solvent 
banks will be unable to compensate for the erosion of 
deposits by issuing securities, and will be more restrictive 
in their attitude to lending (bank lending channel). On the 
other hand, the deterioration in the balance sheet posi-
tion of ﬁ  rms and the decline in the value of the collateral 
that borrowers can present will make the banks more 
cautious (balance sheet channel). Thus, we can observe 
ﬁ  nancial accelerator mechanisms.
The existence of a cashﬂ  ow effect on business investment 
is often regarded as evidence of the existence of a bal-
ance sheet channel, since it indicates cash constraints. 
An analysis conducted on a large sample of Belgian com-
panies recently showed that such an effect was actually 
perceptible in manufacturing industry and in the building 
sector, especially in highly capital-intensive branches and 
in small ﬁ  rms.  (1)
However, at the macroeconomic level it is apparent that 
Belgian companies have relatively low dependence on 
credit granted by resident banks. This situation is due 
in part to greater use of ﬁ  nancing via foreign associate 
companies.
In contrast to the other channels, the exchange rate 
channel has a direct impact on domestic prices  : a cur-
rency appreciation reduces the cost of imports, and that 
is reﬂ  ected with varying degrees of rapidity in consumer 
prices. Moreover, the appreciation depresses demand for 
products of ﬁ  rms in the exposed sector, whose competitive 
position deteriorates, so that it causes a fall in net exports. 
This effect is attenuated by the increase in the purchasing 
power of households, stimulating their consumption.
Adoption of the euro brought about a profound change in 
the exchange rate channel, since it is only exchange rates 
in relation to currencies outside the euro area that now 
vary. Previously, it was quite common for sharp ﬂ  uctua-
tions in the latter to cause tension between currencies of 
the European exchange rate mechanism, particularly if the 
dollar was weak. Moreover, exchange rate adjustments 
resulting from realignments within that mechanism were 
probably perceived as more permanent than ﬂ  uctuations 
in the exchange rates of ﬂ  oating currencies. The exchange 
rate channel has therefore lost some importance. However, 
as a percentage of ﬁ   nal demand, trade with countries 
outside the euro area is more important for Belgium than 




























CHART 3  DEGREE OF OPENNESS OF EURO AREA 
ECONOMIES
Sources : EC, NAI.
(1)  Average of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of final 
demand.
(2)  Average of exports and imports of goods outside the euro area as a percentage of 
the average of total exports and imports of goods.
(3)  Area in which the overall degree of openness times the percentage of foreign 
trade outside the euro area is less than the figure for Belgium.
(4)  Area in which the overall degree of openness times the percentage of foreign 
trade within the euro area is less than the figure for Belgium.
Less exposed than Belgium to trade within
the euro area (4)
Less exposed than Belgium to trade outside
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Belgium comes next after Ireland, along with Finland, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg (see chart 3). That position 
is due in particular to a greater preponderance of imports 
of intermediate products, and may be inﬂ   uenced by a 
“port effect”.
Furthermore, the tightening of monetary policy is neces-
sarily common to all euro area countries, and its effects 
on the Belgian economy depend very much on its impact 
on Belgium’s trading partners within the euro area. Such 
spill-over effects will be particularly substantial for the 
Belgian economy which, after the Luxembourg economy, 
is the most open to trade with the rest of the euro area 
(chart 3).
The description of the channels for transmitting monetary 
policy impulses outlined above is not exhaustive. Thus, 
the increase in the interest burden for businesses pushes 
up costs and that usually reduces supply. The interaction 
between overall supply and demand for goods and serv-
ices and the reactions on the labour market determine the 
scale and proﬁ  le of the price and volume effects, a process 
in which expectations also play a key role.
1.4  Price and volume effects
All other things being equal, a rise in interest rates causes 
a contraction in overall demand which exceeds the reduc-
tion in supply, thus pushing prices down. As we have 
seen, prices may also be affected more directly by a cur-
rency appreciation on the foreign exchange market.
The distribution of the effects of the downward shift in 
demand on activity and prices respectively depends in 
particular on the price and wage setting, especially the 
degree of rigidity and the inﬂ  uence of anticipations. In this 
regard, one special feature in the case of Belgium is the 
automatic wage indexation, which reduces the nominal 
rigidity of wages and increases their real rigidity. However, 
the indexation is tempered by reference to a “health 
index”, which excludes the prices of fuel, alcoholic bever-
ages and tobacco, while wage bargaining makes explicit 
allowance for the need to maintain competitiveness.
Generally speaking, nominal downward rigidities or 
the persistence of inﬂ  ationary expectations imply that a 
tighter monetary policy will cause a relatively large con-
traction in activity before producing the expected effect 
on prices, via under-utilisation of production capacity and 
the labour force. In an inﬂ  ationary context, some growth 
has to be “sacriﬁ  ced” in order to restore price stability. 
On the other hand, if the interest rate hike restores the 
anti-inﬂ  ationary credibility of the central bank, the effect 
on prices may be far more rapid. If the central bank enjoys 
good credibility, it is easier to ensure price stability, and 
monetary policy can make a more effective contribution 
towards stabilising growth.
2.  A simulation exercise
2.1  Limits of the exercise
The great complexity of the monetary policy transmission 
process, where the effects depend in particular on the 
state of the economy and the degree of credibility of the 
central bank, makes it very difﬁ  cult to quantify the effects 
of monetary policy on activity and prices. The results 
of estimates produced via vector autoregressive (VAR) 
models or structural models are therefore rather uncer-
tain orders of magnitude. They proceed from an inevitable 
simpliﬁ  cation of the multiple economic interactions, and 
are therefore sensitive to the modelling choices. Moreover, 
they are necessarily based on regular effects observed in 
the past, in this case a past which may be different from 
the current situation, since the introduction of the single 
currency represented a major structural change.
The studies carried out by the Eurosystem in 2001, the 
main results of which were summarised in the ECB’s 
Monthly Bulletin of October 2002  (1), showed that multiple 
models converged to produce the same picture : a tempo-
rary interest rate increase controlled by the central bank 
causes a transient contraction in activity and a slower but 
more persistent fall in prices. However, the models differ 
in terms of the scale and above all the time proﬁ  le of 
these effects.
The estimates presented below constitute an update of 
some of the simulations carried out at that time. For the 
euro area, they are based on the NiGEM multi-country 
structural model developed by the National Institute 
for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in the United 
Kingdom. The results of this model are the international 
environment variables used in the simulation relating to 
the Belgian economy, based on the Bank’s quarterly struc-
tural model, which has been updated.  (2)
(1)  For a broader account, see I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap and B. Mojon (2003).
(2)  The model published in 2000 – cf. Ph. Jeanﬁ  ls (2000) – was re-estimated over 
a longer period, using new national accounts data (ESA 95) ; the consumption 
function – cf. B. Eugène, Ph. Jeanﬁ  ls and B. Robert (2003) – and the investment 
function, among other things, were reformulated.42
2.2  The assumptions
The monetary shock considered is a 100 basis points 
increase in the key rate over a two-year period, followed 
by a return to the level of the base scenario. Among the 
ﬁ  nancial variables forming a link for the transmission of 
monetary policy impulses, two are of crucial importance  : 
long-term interest rates and foreign exchange rates. In the 
simulation exercise, the duration of the shock (two years) 
is taken as known. According to the uncovered interest 
rate parity assumption, the 1 percentage point rise in the 
short-term interest rate causes an immediate 2 p.c. appre-
ciation in the nominal effective exchange rate, followed 
by a steady depreciation over two years, back to its origi-
nal level, so that this depreciation offsets the short-term 
interest rate differential in relation to the rest of the world. 
Moreover, on the basis of the expectations assumption, 
this same rise in short-term interest rates implies an imme-
diate 0.2 p.c. increase in the 10-year bond rate, followed 
by a steady decline over two years, so that the yield on a 
10-year investment remains equivalent to that on succes-
sive short-term investments.
The effect of an interest rate increase with no change in 
exchange rates will also be examined, in order to take 
account of the particularly uncertain character of the reac-
tion of the foreign exchange markets, and to highlight the 
speciﬁ  c features of the exchange rate channel.
2.3   Effects on activity and prices in the euro area
The simulations effected by means of the NiGEM model 
for the euro area conﬁ  rm the general conclusion of earlier 
studies, namely that – all other things being equal – tight-
ening of monetary policy causes a temporary contraction 
in activity and a slower but more sustained fall in prices.
If exchange rates are held steady, it is only activity that 
reacts to the interest rate hike in the ﬁ  rst two years of the 
simulation. The absence of any immediate fall in prices, 
or even the presence of a slight rise, may be due to price 
rigidity, the impact of the increase in the cost of capital on 
supply, and the rise in unit labour costs resulting from a 
slow reaction by employment and wages to the contrac-
tion in activity. Prices subsequently fall, owing to the lower 
rate of utilisation of the economy’s productive capacity, 
and this movement persists well after the end of the mon-
etary shock, whereas activity returns to the base level.
If exchange rates react to the interest rate increase, 
that ampliﬁ  es the temporary contraction in activity, but 
above all it leads to a faster and more pronounced fall in 
prices. Even before it inﬂ  uences the level of production, 
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CHART 5  EFFECTS OF THE MONETARY POLICY 
TIGHTENING ON REAL GDP AND CONSUMER 
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on prices. The fall in import costs is to some extent very 
promptly reﬂ   ected in consumer prices – in the case 
of imports of petroleum products or consumer goods 
– and to some extent more slowly – in the case of capital 
goods and intermediate products, where the decline in 
prices has a positive effect on supply. Despite these price 
responses which vary in speed, the appreciation of the 
euro depresses activity in so far as the impact of the loss 
of competitiveness outweighs that of the improvement in 
domestic purchasing power.
2.4  Effects on activity and prices in Belgium
The effects of a monetary policy tightening on activity 
and prices in Belgium do not appear to be noticeably dif-
ferent from those estimated for the euro area. According 
to the Bank’s model, the temporary contraction in activ-
ity appears to be slightly weaker, and the fall in prices is 
faster, irrespective of whether the exchange rate channel 
is taken into account.
Subject to the points of uncertainty mentioned above, 
particularly the differences in modelling, it therefore 
seems that a number of the speciﬁ  c  features  of  the 
Belgian economy mentioned in the ﬁ  rst part of this arti-
cle, such as the high level of net household wealth or the 
high degree of openness to countries outside the euro 
area, have no evident impact on the macroeconomic con-
sequences of a monetary policy tightening. On the other 
hand, wage indexation – which is a handicap in other 
circumstances – may contribute to the faster spread of 
price reductions, particularly following the appreciation 
of the euro  (1), and may thus improve the “sacriﬁ  ce ratio”, 
i.e. reduce the scale of the decline in activity necessary to 
curb inﬂ  ation. Conversely, wage indexation reduces the 
expansionary effect of any easing of monetary policy.
As regards the degree of openness of the Belgian econ-
omy to the rest of the euro area, this plays an important 
role, since a large part of the effects of monetary policy 
is due to its impact on the economies of the partner 
countries.
2.5  Effects on the main components of demand
Examination of the impact of a monetary policy tightening 
– including via the exchange rate channel – on the main 
components of expenditure at constant prices in the euro 
area, estimated by means of the NiGEM model, reveals the 
high sensitivity of investment. The contraction in invest-
ment owing to an accelerator effect – albeit delayed by the 
adjustment lags – makes a greater   contribution towards 
the decline in real GDP than the fall in consumption, 
though the latter has a greater weight. The appreciation 
of the euro causes a fall in net exports in the ﬁ  rst year, but 
that effect subsequently disappears owing to the decline 
in imports.
The smaller decline in real GDP in Belgium during the ﬁ  rst 
two years, according to the Bank’s model, in comparison 
with the euro area is due to a smaller contraction in invest-
ments, which may be due to a slightly lower dependence 
on bank lending, at the macroeconomic level, and a fairly 
weak accelerator effect.
3.  Conclusions
The ﬁ  rst part of this article highlighted the complexity of 
the transmission of monetary policy impulses, character-
ised by long and uncertain time lags and dependent, in 
particular, on the state of the economy and the credibility 
(1)  Wage indexation causes a smaller deterioration in competitiveness and a lesser 
appropriation by employees of gains in the terms of trade in the case of an 
appreciation of the euro. However, it is not immediate and the health index is not 
exhaustive.





















CHART 6  EFFECT OF THE MONETARY POLICY TIGHTENING 
ON REAL GDP AND ITS MAIN COMPONENTS
  (Contributions to the deviation of real GDP from the base level 
over the first five years, in percentage points)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Mainly net exports of goods and services.44
of the central bank. Some special features of the Belgian 
economy were mentioned, such as its high degree of 
openness, especially in relation to euro area partners, the 
high level of household ﬁ  nancial assets, relatively weak 
dependence on bank lending at a macroeconomic level, 
and the automatic indexation of wages.
The macroeconomic simulations presented in the second 
part of the article showed that, in Belgium as in the 
euro area, a monetary policy tightening tends to cause 
a temporary contraction in activity, due substantially to 
the decline in investment, and a slower but more persist-
ent fall in prices. The euro appreciation normally caused 
by such a monetary policy shock ampliﬁ  es its effects on 
activity, but above all accelerates its impact on prices. The 
reaction of the Belgian economy does not appear to be 
obviously different from that of the rest of the euro area. 
It seems to be slightly more moderate in volume, owing 
to the lower sensitivity of investment, and more rapid in 
terms of prices.45
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